Me What I’m Reading
Inattentional blindness (IB), the failure to perceive salient stimuli when attention is directed elsewhere, challenges assumptions about visual awareness. Despite extensive research on neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs), mechanisms underlying IB for complex stimuli remain poorly understood. Here, we leveraged a three-phase no-report paradigm to investigate neural signatures of conscious awareness in IB (using EEG). Participants performed a challenging peripheral attention task while simultaneously being presented centrally with faces, houses, or visual noise. At each phase’s end, they were probed about various presented objects, including faces and houses. In phase 2, participants were informed about the presence of faces and houses but continued the same task. In phase 3, they were instructed to ignore the peripheral task and instead identify the central stimuli (faces, houses, noise) in a three-alternative forced-choice (3AFC) task. Contrasting phase 2 with phase 1 identified two distinct neural components: Visual Awareness Negativity (VAN, 180–220 ms) and a novel Visual Awareness Positivity (VAP, 250–400 ms) characterized by bilateral-posterior positive and frontal-central negative differences. The P3b/P300, a traditional NCC marker, was absent during phases 1 and 2 but present during phase 3. Time-frequency cluster analysis revealed significant differences in theta, alpha, and beta ranges, implicating these rhythms in visual consciousness. These findings replicate previous results regarding the VAN and identify novel markers of conscious perception, including the VAP, meta-stable decoding, and differential theta power, in no-report conditions. This study deepens our understanding of visual awareness and highlights novel neural markers as potential NCCs in no-report paradigms.
Φ as a System’s Capacity for Consciousness: An Illusionist Integrated Information Theory Approach
Integrated Information Theory (IIT) attributes subjective experience to integrated information, which can be measured quantitatively as a value, Φ, and it has shown real empirical success through tools like the perturbational complexity index (PCI). However, IIT is not widely accepted, and I’d like to make the case that though Φ is heavily correlated with what we describe as consciousness, it actually measures an alternative state of our neural system, and that our assertions of consciousness being necessarily related to this correlation are false. I take Illusionist Integrated Information Theory (iIIT), first introduced by Kelvin McQueen, as the groundwork for this claim. Illusionism holds that phenomenal consciousness, as we conceive of it, is not at face value real. McQueen argues that an illusionist framework makes IIT more coherent and less metaphysically demanding, in part because it avoids the logic gate objection. From there, I argue that IIT has not always had a consistent definition of consciousness, most visibly in its treatment of dreamless sleep. IIT’s axioms force us to “bite the bullet” and grant consciousness to a state with no phenomenal experience, no memory, and no unified self. Rather than defend this, I propose that Φ is better understood as the ground on which consciousness is experienced. In other words, Φ indicates a system’s capacity to produce the memory, conceptions of self, and higher-order cognitive behaviors that give rise to our belief in consciousness, and not consciousness itself. By reframing Φ this way, it loses some potency as the singular indication of consciousness, but it becomes a more tangible theory that can be explored with greater perspective.
Meaning as Experience: A Synthesis of Putnam and Block
In this paper, I aim to portray meaning as a pure correlate of experience. I will utilize Hilary Putnam’s “Twin Earth” argument to identify an ambiguity in the conceptualization of meaning, and in doing so will attempt to identify experience as a sufficient origin of meaning. I hope to go beyond the traditional categories of internalist or externalist theories of meaning and instead posit a comprehensive and understandable model of where meaning comes from. After articulating this model, I will raise some concerns about the inherent ambiguity and subjectivity of experience as a basis for the ambiguity that lies in our meaning of words. From here, my thesis is such that in order to precisely determine meaning, we must first precisely identify what constitutes our subjective experiences. I will then review a method of identifying our experiences as put forth by Ned Block. The basis of this review is to ponder the question of whether our experiences can be “so divorced from cognitive access that a subject can have an experience that [they] do not and cannot think about” . Entertaining Block’s conception of phenomenal versus access consciousness, I will propose an interpretation of meaning that identifies precisely where the ambiguity lies.
By Jia Tolentino.
An incredible treatise on the self and the use of the internet drawing heavily on Goffman’s ‘the presentation of self in everyday life’ and applying it to the internet with a precision and articulation of personal experience I have only seen rivaled in DFW’s nonfiction essays. I am still searching for an exploration of internet use which has any actualizable advice except to remove it from one’s life entirely. The more analysis I see about social media and its inherent influence on our sociability, politics, and fulfillment, the more radical I think I must become in my abstention to ever be happy in a world which contains the internet.
Consciousness and the fallacy of misplaced objectivity
By Francesco Ellia, Jeremiah Hendren, Matteo Grasso, Csaba Kozma, Garrett Mindt, Jonathan P.Lang, Andrew M. Huan, Larissa Albantakis, Melanie Boly, and Giulio Tononi
For those interested in the science of consciousness - this paper to me is the seminal argument (though it has been made other times through different methods) for introducing a valid avenue of phenomenological study into neuroscience research. Essentially this essay states that there can be objective study of subjective experience without having to rely on functional correlates of consciousness, and it provides a methodology to do so.
Cognitive Motor Dissociations in Disorders of Consciousness
Yelena G. Bodien, Ph.D. https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4858-2903, Judith Allanson, F.R.C.P., Ph.D., Paolo Cardone, M.S. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8537-2123, Arthur Bonhomme, M.D., Jerina Carmona, M.P.H., Camille Chatelle, Ph.D., Srivas Chennu, Ph.D., +31, and Nicholas D. Schiff, M.D
This one has been making the rounds in pop science and general media since it came out. It is certainly shocking and to those who are unaffiliated with the idea of latent consciousness in vegetative/minimally conscious states, it may be frightening. This is the perfect continuation of the initial experiements done by Schiff, which were critiquef for having too small a sample size as well as a debatable diagnosis of their primary patient of being either MCS or VS. This new study certainly quiets any doubts. However I am not incredibly blown away by their control (MCS) figures. There is certainly a statistically significant difference but the difference between MCS, and VS patients in their ability to “answer” questions with fMRI does not impress me that much still. Very interesting and exciting and would be eager to see more done on this.